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in the short term, other nations can
provide the human intelligence capabilities that the United States currently
lacks. Finally, the authors recognize
that local and state officials rather than
members of the federal government are
on the front lines in one major theater
of operations—the homeland. Consequently, the book recommends ways of
allowing decentralized coordination
among federal, state, and local authorities that maintain a balance between the
civil rights of the citizenry and the necessity of prosecuting a vigorous
campaign.
However, one must ask why—in light
of their insightful recognition for the
need for an integrated command, control, and coordination of an incredibly
diverse repertoire of efforts to fight the
war against terrorism—the authors refused to consider any real command
and control organization, process, system, or doctrine. In place of such a useful, even vital capability, To Prevail
merely calls for more commissions,
more coordination, and more openness,
and information sharing among existing agencies. The authors are Washington veterans who must know how naïve
their recommendations on this matter
sound. They recommend against forming a powerful department of homeland
security that would be capable of integrating the diverse and often contradictory and self-defeating efforts of a
variety of federal agencies. One never
really fully understands who or what
the authors are suggesting will conduct
the overall campaign planning and
oversight of the global war on terror.
The fact is that at this writing, it is still
not clear which federal entity is conducting the command and control functions
of much of the global campaign. This

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

country learned quickly in World War
II that crises alone, even sneak attacks,
do not overcome bureaucratic turf
wars; the nation is relearning that lesson now. The authors must know this,
and they should propose an organizational framework to implement the
wide array of global and domestic measures advocated in their strategy.
To Prevail is for the serious strategic
thinker and decision maker. It is a commendable effort to bring together in
one place a comprehensive strategy that
can bring success in what promises to
be a long and unusual war. My only
quibble is the shortage of relevant citations, which is probably due to the
quickness of editing and publication.
Such is the price of currency.
JON CZARNECKI

Naval War College
Monterey Program
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Although not recognized as an equal academic discipline by mainstream academics, the study of strategy has a long
and honorable history—the result of
numerous authors who, over the centuries, have developed their ideas and
placed their own imprints on the discipline. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, when the threat of nuclear destruction concentrated the minds of
scholars, the field shifted from traditional military concerns to the study of
nuclear deterrence. But now, more than
a decade beyond the end of the Cold
War, strategic studies return to their
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origins, though in a time rife with novel
challenges. Strategy in the Contemporary
World marks a good first step for the
discipline.
The editors, strategists all, have assembled a remarkable introduction to strategic studies. Not only is it the first
textbook on the subject rather than a
collection of edited readings, but it is
singularly helpful to the novice. The
book addresses a broad array of subjects
and may refresh experienced strategists
on subjects outside their expertise.
The book’s fourteen chapters by seventeen authors have been organized into
four sections: “Enduring Issues,” “Evolution of Joint Warfare,” “TwentiethCentury Theories,” and “Contemporary
Issues.” The subject of each chapter
varies tremendously—an introduction
to strategic studies; the causes of war;
great strategists of the past; land, air,
and naval power; terrorism and irregular warfare; international law; deterrence; weapons of mass destruction;
technology and warfare; humanitarian
intervention; nontraditional security
concerns (environmental degradation,
etc.); and others.
Each chapter, despite the analytical bias
of its author (or authors), explores the
fundamentals of its subject fairly well.
For example, in “Sea Power: Theory
and Practice,” Captain Sam Tangredi,
USN, traces the historical and theoretical lineage for sea power versus land
power. He defines sea power broadly to
include maritime trade and ocean resources, and he analyzes the importance
of sea lines of communication. Tangredi evaluates the works of Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Soviet admiral
Sergei Gorshkov as they relate to the
debate over naval strategy during the
Cold War. He follows this by discussing
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naval theory for the post–Cold War era
of smaller navies, wider threats, and
only one truly global naval power. That
is to say, he covers the subject broadly,
but with finesse.
The typical problems with multiauthored works are absent in this book.
A strong editorial hand has blended the
various chapters to read as if the same
author had penned them. In addition,
the book contains clear introductions
and conclusions; key points are summarized in each section; questions are
included at the end of each chapter; and
further reading references are listed.
Students and instructors could make
good use of this book.
Only one minor inconsistency mars this
otherwise good work. Strategy and strategic studies have long recognized the
relationship between politics and war.
Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war is a
continuation of political discourse by
other means. Truth be told, to understand strategy—the art of marrying military means to political ends—one must
look constantly to its political origins.
The worth of this idea can be seen in
the want of it in some of these chapters.
For example, in “Arms Control and
Disarmament,” John Baylis entirely divorces the subject from the politics of
nations. Thus when he reports on the
charges and countercharges of arms violations between the United States and
the Soviet Union during the 1980s,
without reference to politics and policies, the states’ behaviors appear morally equivalent. In contrast, James D.
Kiras emphasizes the political objectives
of war in his chapter, “Terrorism and
Irregular Warfare,” helping the reader
to make sense of how unconventional
tactics may or may not accomplish certain goals.
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This is a minor problem, however. It
does not significantly mar an excellent
work that will serve anyone desiring
grounding in strategic studies or a refresher on strategy.
MARK T. CLARK

California State University
San Bernardino, California

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 448pp.
$27.95

This monumental and ambitious work
sets out to provide the definitive account
of the “offensive realism” school of international relations theory. Offensive
realism represents a kind of synthesis of
the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau and the structural or “defensive”
realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Morgenthau it assumes that states (or major
states) seek to accumulate as much
power as possible for themselves, but it
accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they
do so lies in the structure of the international system rather than in the human
lust for power. Mearsheimer must therefore show that Waltz and his many followers have been overly optimistic in
analyzing the implications for state behavior of the anarchic character of the
international system. According to
Mearsheimer, they have wrongly assumed that a cautious or defensive approach to safeguarding a state’s security
is the only rational approach and hence
the norm for most states. Rather, he insists, aggressive or expansionist behavior
is both more common in the recent history of the great powers than this would
allow and more rational in the sense that
it is not infrequently very successful.
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Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated,
from the history of the great powers
from the wars of the French Revolution
through the end of the Cold War. It also
looks out into the future to test the theory against the common if vaguely articulated belief that great-power war has
become obsolete. For these reasons, and
because it is written in a clear and jargonfree style, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics holds much interest even for
those with limited patience for the theological disputes of international relations
theorists. At the same time, it is a formidable challenge to mainstream realism.
It scores many points off an approach
that somehow never comes to grips with
what one is tempted to call the sheer
bloody-mindedness of international politics. Particularly novel and persuasive is
Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck passing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fundamental alternative to balancing against
another power.
Yet the book has its limitations, which
are largely the limitations of the realist
school as such. Mearsheimer never quite
convinces when he argues that the domestic regimes and leadership of, for example, Britain, the United States, Nazi
Germany, and imperial Japan had no
fundamental impact on their international behavior. But perhaps the weakest
part of the book is its disregard of the
ideological context of nineteenth-century European diplomacy. The antirevolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,”
were arguably at least as important in
maintaining the long great-power peace
through much of this period as were the
abstract structural characteristics of the
European state system. For that matter,
the fact that many of the wars that did
occur were connected in some way with
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